INTL498 - Final - Patterson, Megan

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1 Russian Invasion and War in Ukraine: Estimate on Regional Consequences Megan Patterson Senior Seminar Course number: INTL498 19 February, 2023

2 This paper serves as an abbreviated National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on the regional consequences of the 2022 Russian invasion and war in Ukraine. In following standard NIE formatting, included within will be estimative language set by Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) standards, key takeaways, and key judgements/assumptions. Key Takeaway Modern warfare presents a hybrid battlefield of cyber-attacks, economic and humanitarian crises, disinformation/misinformation campaigns, and the threat of nuclear war. The globalized nature of the world we live in means the Russian invasion of Ukraine has long lasting and far-reaching implications on global security, international economy, and the architecture of global energy. The subsequent altered calculus of political, economic, and trade relations with Russia will have lasting ramifications throughout Europe and beyond as global supply chains and energy insecurities are challenged. While Russia faces many challenges across these various topics, its ability to project strength both in strategic messaging as well as military capability and economic rebound show a resolve which could greatly influence its standing as a global power over the next 20 to 30 years. For Ukraine and the greater European continent and political West, the war has highlighted the need for rapid restructuring of economic and security priorities and a need to build and maintain key partnerships with emerging nations in order to ensure survival of democracy on the international stage. Finally, the Russo-Ukraine war has provided an opportunity for China to enhance its own strategic foothold on global economy and security as it looks to counter western influence through mutual support with Russia while simultaneously advancing its own interests regardless of Russian priorities. Key Judgements: 1) Based on current trends and strategic messaging, it is assessed with high confidence that international support for Ukraine will persist in efforts to counter a Russian

3 advantage while strengthening allied support against the expanding influence of Russia and China on global markets. 2) There are four ways that the war in Ukraine can end, each with its own consequences. First, and least likely, would be Russia’s decisive victory over Ukraine and the subsequent descent of a new iron curtain. Second, a partial victory for Russia through internationally recognized annexation of lands currently occupied by Russian forces resulting in perpetual instability throughout the region. Third, should Ukraine achieve a decisive victory, it is highly likely that Putin’s regime would fall, increasing the potential for a fall of the Russian Federation as well. Lastly, and the most likely outcome for the end of the war in Ukraine, is a partial Ukrainian victory in which Ukrainian forces, with international assistance, successfully counter Russian assaults and effectively force Russia to the negotiation table. This brings the potential for a more peaceful Eurasia, or the creation of more conflicts as complex negotiations on security arrangements throughout the region would be paramount. 3) It is assessed with moderate confidence that China’s investments and trade agreements with Russia will continue to counter Western sanctions and embolden Russia to persist with military action against Ukraine. Furthermore, continued Chinese support in countering U.S. and European assistance in Ukraine will hinder negotiations and significantly reduce the possibility of the war ending before 2024. The Battle for Power: Energy in Demand Since the Russian invasion and subsequent annexation of Crimea in 2014, it is evident that energy sources and critical infrastructure are key targets which Russian forces use as a form of geopolitical weapon to influence their adversaries or will groups into capitulation. Europe’s efforts to decrease its energy dependence through renewables and supplier diversification had direct implications on the Kremlin’s ability to generate revenue through

4 gas supply (National Intelligence Council 2019). This impact was further realized following the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and subsequent sanctions which limited the ability of the Kremlin to offset decreases in revenue through export to customers in Asia. Ukraine relies heavily upon gas in its energy system and energy security will be paramount for ensuring the country can fully recover from its current wartime standing. Substantial domestic gas resources and positioning as an asset for the transition of Europe’s energy away from Russia has allowed Ukraine to withstand blows to its infrastructure. Where nuclear energy was once prominent, Russian attacks knocked out nearly 50% of Ukraine’s generation capacity with reactors in shutdown due to risks from shelling, damage, and Russian occupation. Conversely, renewable energy such as wind, solar and hydro, all expanded in generation capacity as a key priority leading into postwar reconstruction efforts. Ukraine remains one of the largest gas holders in Europe with most gas resources located in the eastern Dnieper-Donetsk region, an area that has seen some of the most intense conflict. In order to ensure long-term goals of reducing Russian gas transiting Ukraine while increasing Ukrainian gas exports throughout Europe, Ukraine will need to secure gas transit routes, reinforce and repurpose its underground gas storage capacities and capabilities, and look past simply reconstruction of damaged energy infrastructure toward potential opportunities to leapfrog in technologies and diversified means of energy production (Cahill and Palti-Guzman 2023). At the start of 2022, Europe was linked to Russian gas through six pipelines with Nord Streams 1 and 2 supplying over 40% of natural gas to Europe. With the onset of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia decreased supply of natural gas to Europe in an effort to stifle European resolve in support of Ukraine and thus gain an early advantage. Following a period of decline since 2021 and a rapid drop in supply after the September 2022 sabotage of the Nord Stream 1 pipeline, Russian gas exports to Europe are

5 currently a quarter of what they were previously. This tactic, however, had the opposite effect and instead resulted in a much more unified European approach to filling storage and shifting to conservative measures and renewable power in order to migrate energy dependency away from Russian gas supplies. These shifts and emerging markets in gas infrastructure will dramatically alter global gas trade and energy markets and will likely create new climate challenges as the rapid shift to energy alternatives leaves developing markets vulnerable to poor practices (Palti-Guzman, Majkut and Barlow 2023). As a result of European shifts in energy trade, the EU will continue to rely heavily upon U.S. and Norwegian liquid natural gas (LNG). The U.S. became the second largest exporter of gas to the region and saw the greatest rise in units imported out of all LNG sources (see Figures 1 and 2). This shift in energy trade flows impacts not only the U.S. and the EU, but also those countries who have carried the burden of increased prices and diverted energy supply. In the U.S., taxpayers will be unlikely to continue support of long-term rises in price and running large-scale liquefication plants at maximum capacity for a seemingly endless war. Additionally, a failure in U.S. gas infrastructure would bring forth significant ramifications for global energy security, further driving the importance of cyber security and a diverse energy infrastructure to support demand moving forward (Palti-Guzman, Majkut and Barlow 2023). Meanwhile, limited energy supplies abroad coupled with high inflation will negatively impact economic growth and result in increased protectionism and desire to turn inward as opposed to building multilateral cooperations. Divergent priorities over the war in Ukraine will likely influence investments and increased commercial ties that pull opportunities away from the U.S. and its strategic energy security goals and increase the role of China on the international stage (Stratfor Global Intelligence 2023a).

6 Figure 1. U.S. LNG Exports, 2021 vs. 2022 Trade flows of vessels that left the United States between January 1, 2021 to June 1, 2021 and January 1, 2022 to June 1, 2022 Source: Palti-Guzman, Majkut and Barlow 2023 Figure 2. EU-28 Natural Gas Imports, 2021–2022 All units in billion cubic meters (bcm). EU-28 defined as EU-27 + UK; Russian LNG exports are net (i.e., Russian exports consumed in Europe) Source: Palti-Guzman, Majkut and Barlow 2023 For Russia, it is highly likely that domestic support for President Putin and the war in Ukraine will continue to decline in light of economic contractions and without any major battlefield successes. Falling oil production compounded by wide sanctions have increased the probability of severe economic difficulties should there be any large fall in crude oil prices or decision to enforce an even lower Russian oil cap price (Stratfor Global Intelligence

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